Sociology

NOTE ON RATIONAL-LEGAL AUTHORITY

Rational-Legal Authority

Rational legal authority, or simply legal authority, is a concept developed by Max Weber (1864–1920) to explain the stability of domination in modern times, especially in bureaucracies and democracies (1978). Legal authority is best understood as one of three types of authority or legitimate domination identified by Weber.

According to Weber, legal authority is the only type of authority that is validated on rational grounds – it relies neither on assumptions about the sanctity of traditions nor on devotion to an exemplary individual and his revelations like traditional and charismatic authorities. Legal authority’s rationality is expressed in multiple ways. For instance, its validity lies in the assumption that laws that give the authority a right to command can change if the laws are justified on instrumental or value-rational grounds. These laws do not result from revelation or tradition, as those would be nonrational grounds. Laws are also supposed to be consistent and clearly established in writing. This includes a clear chain of supervision and command. Finally, the staff in the ruling organization are supposed to be appointed on rational grounds such as technical qualifications, rather than, for instance, personal favours or inheritance. The last three characteristics, among other factors, make bureaucracies, the ruling organizations based on legal authority, the most efficient form of ruling.

Legal authority is also distinct from the other two types of authority in that it is impersonal, while the other types are personal. In the case of legal authority, obedience is ultimately owed to the impersonal legal order rather than to the person in authority; this order extends the duty to obedience to the person. That means that the person is distinguished from the office and can only legitimately command within limits authorized for that office. Thus, in a democracy, a president cannot sentence people to jail, as it is not within the president’s scope of authority. Additionally, the president is also subject to the impersonal order and must obey other authorities established by that order, such as judges.

Legal and traditional authority is also distinct from the charismatic authority in that they are ordinary or everyday authority rather than extraordinary. This is particularly important because it makes traditional and legal-rational authorities more stable than charismatic ones – the latter must constantly prove their extraordinary character and have difficulties defining a successor for the ruler. Thus, while pure cases of legal authority are unlikely, the concept is especially useful for understanding how charismatic authorities adopt elements of legal authority to stabilize their rule. Weber calls this routinization of charisma.

Many scholars have used Weber’s concept of legal authority to explore legitimation in cases relating to political leaders around the world, constitutions, military organizations, judges, churches, and professionals. Yet the concept has also been questioned.